According to the analysis of the bidding and tendering for Chinese railway engineering construction projects in the past 10 years, the strong reciprocity phenomenon between the owners and contractors that accepted and maintained the specific cooperation is discovered in this study. Based on the existing supporting theory of cooperation behavior in the field of brain science, the theory of strong reciprocity is proposed to analyze the game and cooperation mechanism between the owner and the contractor under the bounded rationality. Moreover, the evolutionary game model for the relationship between the owners and contractors of railway engineering projects is established in this research. Simultaneously, the numerical simulation analysis for the influence of different parameter variables on the evolution of the model is conducted. Finally, the results of the study show that when they anticipating the cooperation of the counterparty, the owner and the contractor will respond positively to cooperation. On the contrary, the owners and contractors or third-party regulatory agencies will punish uncooperative behaviors that disrupt cooperation rules. The research results about the cooperative behavior between the owner and the contractor coincides with the interpretation of cooperation in the field of brain science.
Introduction
The strong reciprocity refers to those who are willing to cooperate with others in the group and do not hesitate to spend personal costs to punish those who violate the rules of cooperation. The Santa Fe economist Gintis and Bowles (Bowles and Gintis, 2004 ) discovered the existence of the strong reciprocity behavior by using computer simulation techniques to simulate the formation of the cooperative order of human hunting communities 10-20 million years ago, which is a necessary condition for maintaining cooperative relations within the original ethnic group. And the strong reciprocity behavior is essentially an important manifestation of the human brain neurobehavioral mechanism. From the existing researches about brain neurobehavioral science, the evidence for strong reciprocal behavior has been quite abundant in brain science. And there is a consensus that the human brain has three layers, which come from different stages of evolution and have different functions. Moreover, the second layer is called the limbic system (also known as emotional brain), which is the source of emotional activities. The psychological activities known as desire, aspiration, and impulsiveness are all born here (Wang, 2011; Schneck and Francis, 2000) . Therefore, it can obviously be seen that the human social preferences (i.e. the strong reciprocity behavior) that are controlled by the second layer of brain area are gradually formed during long-term evolution.
According to the long-term evolution process analysis of the cooperation behavior between the owner and the contractor, it is found that the cooperative behavior relationship belongs to the research field of the strong reciprocity theory. Combining with theoretical analysis of cranial neurobehavioral science, an evolutionary model of the cooperative relationship between owners and contractors is established using evolutionary game theory. Moreover, it also tries to reveal the formation and evolution of the cooperative relationship between the owner and the contractor from a dynamic perspective. Furthermore, with the introduction of penalty factors by appropriate modification of building regulations, the partner or alliance protocol model should be adopted in railway construction projects to improve the efficiency and level of project management.
Literature

Review of neurobehavioral research
Since the 1990s, with the development of brain science and cognitive science, brain scientists have accumulated a large amount of brain science data by using the advanced techniques such as functional neuroimaging and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to analyze the nervous system controls human trust, cooperation, and reciprocal behaviors. In 1996, the Mirror Neuron which provided the neurobiological basis for the cooperation behavior analysis between the owner and the contractor is found in the premotor area of human cerebral cortex (Rizzolatti et al., 1996) . A well-known professor of behavioral neuroscience pointed out that the striata, including the nucleus accumbens and caudate nucleus, is activated when the respondent cooperated with others (Rilling, 2002) . A random matching repeated prisoner dilemma experiment (random matching repeated PD) was conducted to discover that respondents are more willing to collaborate with collaborating teammates or unqualified teammates than noncooperative teammates (Suzuki et al., 2011) . Moreover, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), bilateral posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), and temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) is more active when confronted with uncooperative teammates. In addition, the existing research shows that the respondent would punish others with altruism when they were treated unfairly, and their dorsal striatum's tail nucleus would be activated (De et al., 2004) . Furthermore, the activity of the tail nucleus is positively correlated with the cost of punishing others. The article published in nature found that the fronto-insular cortex and anterior cingulate cortices in the brain of the respondent were associated while he sees the suffering of the teammate with fair behavior (Singer et al., 2006) . The discovery of these brain neurobehavioral scientific studies is helpful to better understand the strong reciprocal behavior between owners and contractors. The approximate positions of neural which control the cooperative behavioral in human brain is shown in Figure 1 . Additionally, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) plays a role in the inhibition of emotional responses, and in the process of decision making and self-control. And the lateral prefrontal cortex (lateral PFC) is implicated in planning complex cognitive behavior, personality expression, decision making, and moderating social behavior. And the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) is implicated in processing both the detection and appraisal of social processes. The dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) is involved in creating a sense of the self. And the amygdala performs a primary role in the processing of memory, decision-making, and emotional responses. In addition, striatum is divided into a ventral striatum and a dorsal striatum, and which coordinates motor and action planning, decisionmaking, motivation, reinforcement, and reward perception.
Summary of researches on cooperation behavior between owners and contractors
In the current management system, the contractor usually develops a kind of economic relationship with the owners by way of bidding to the owner and defines their own rights, responsibilities and interests under the contract. Given that the railway construction projects are highly similar, in the face of new construction projects, whether owner continues to use previous bidding for time-consuming, laborious and expensive projects or directly chooses the contractors who have rich experience in cooperation through competitive negotiation or under a cooperation agreement signed between both. These are behaviors in question all parties concern. This paper explores and attempts these behaviors in part of projects in accordance with construction regulations. It is obvious that the latter helps the cooperation between both more likely succeed along with the increase of cooperation frequency and the reduction of the cooperation cost.
Many domestic and foreign scholars probed into the original occurrence mechanism and maintenance mechanism of the mutual game between the owner and the contractor, and have made a series of studies. Some researchers applied the game theory to analyze the Prisoners Dilemma of the behaviors among strategic alliance members, and gave out the conditions required for the stability of evolvement relationship (Parkhe, 1993; Das and Teng, 2000; Ren and Zhang, 2015; González et al., 2016; Tan, 2016) . However, the model assumes that the members are perfect rationality, which results in that the game analysis disagrees with the individual behavior in the reality. Some researchers (Wang et al., 2016; applied the coevolution game theory to analyze the historical payoffs can greatly promote the cooperation behaviors. And some scholars (Yan et al., 2011; Matej, 2017) analyzed the stability of the membership behavior in the evolution process of the strategic alliance based on the stochastic differential equation and demonstrated that the stochastic dynamic equation was more universal than the deterministic dynamic equation for analyzing evolutions of competitive and cooperative strategies. Moreover, a new model of mixed strategy system is proposed for spatial prisoner's dilemma games (Tanimoto, 2015) . And Chen et al. (2009) used the evolutionary game model and imported drift term therein to explore the opportunism in the international joint venture. Subsequently, a multi-level framework of collaborative networks is developed so that it can enhance partnering when facing delivers competitive solutions (Durugbo and Christopher, 2016) . Sun et al., (2012) proposed the technological innovation dynamic mechanism for railway engineering project. Wang et al., (2007) made a contrastive analysis on the cooperative evolution mechanism between the owner and the contractor in the traditional project management and the partnering modes. A model is developed and validated it to quantify the productivity loss (Serag et al., 2008) . Zhang et al. (2010) analyzes the strategies of cooperative innovation under the evolutionary game theory. And the corporation's decision-making is affected by the revenue of its strategy before cooperative innovation and by the probability of the other corporation's strategy in the process of cooperative innovation. Zhou et al. (2017) pointed that the owner and the trusted party should cooperate to meet the management model in the construction of railway. The above studies have a positive effect on developing good cooperation relationship between the owners and the contractors and on the optimization of the project management mode. Drawn on the above research results, this paper introduces the evolutionary game model into the game relationship between the owners and the contractor in the railway construction, builds the evolutionary model for the relationship between the owner and the contractor, and attempts to recognize, explain and explore the formation and the evolution rule of bidding, competitive negotiation and agreement mode from a dynamic Perspective (Pennisi, 2005; Nowak, 2006; Feniosky and Harpoth, 2001) . To improve the project management efficiency and level, the partnership or coalition agreement may be allowed when appropriate, on the basis of the bidding and competitive negotiation in China's railway construction, provided that the building regulations may be amended moderately and the penalty factor is imported therein. When the owner or contractor weighs the egoistic and altruistic strategies in a social dilemma, they will activate the reward system of the midbrain. The reward system is mainly responsible for handling the possible outcomes of decisions to guide decision-making behavior (O'Doherty, 2004) . The vmPFC, dorsal striatum (nucleus accumbens or caudate nucleus) and ventral striatum are responsible for estimating and forming reward expectations, and assessing whether subsequent decisions could meet reward expectations (i.e. arrow 1) (Arora et al., 2012) . The cognitive control and social cognition may have an impact on the rewards system. The cognitive control system give priority to process trust and threat signals to generate economic incentives based on rewards (such as money and reputation) (i.e. arrow 2). The social cognition system give priority to process external rewards and punishment signals to generate socially cooperative motivation (i.e. arrow 3). The reward system will generate different willingness to cooperate through the cognitive control and social cognition system. When rewards result in satisfactory economic benefits, reward systems guide collaborative decision-making toward economic rationality (i.e. arrow 4). When a trust signal exists, the reward system will make a cooperative decision that favors social rationality based on intrinsic motivation (i.e. arrow 5).
Problem Description and Construction
Problem description
The author has consulted a large number of pertinent literatures and collected the bidding results (as shown in the table below) updated since 2007 about railway construction. It is found that the bidding for the railway construction projects has a specific law. Although the bidding each time as individual game results differs a lot, in view of a long-term accumulative tender results, it roughly coincides with the agreement model. As shown in the table above, in the bidding of the railway construction projects, almost half of these projects were obtained by China Railway and China Railway Construction, and less than 10% projects are won by Chinese Architecture, China Communications Construction Company Limited, China Water Conservancy, etc. Actual data indicates that the Chinese railway construction industry always adheres to the principle that the winner won the bid after single game and the bidding project each time in accordance with the domestic construction laws and regulations over many years. The previous biddings were inspected from the evolution process at some time in the past. The results reveal those bidders who won the bid for railway construction projects are mostly China Railway and China Railway Construction. From this phenomenon, we find that there is a plausible correlation between the contingency of a single eISSN 1303-5150 www.neuroquantology.com 209 shot game and the inevitability of multi-repetitive games. This paper, based on the hypothesis of bounded rationality, applies the evolutionary game to explore the game and the cooperation behaviors between the owner and the contractor in the railway construction projects, find out the internal mechanism therein to explain the spontaneous cooperation between two sides, thus providing the scientific evidence and the theoretical basis for improvement and optimization of the bidding system and innovation of the project management mode.
Building evolutionary game model (1) Constraints for game model A survey conducted on relevant authority of China Railway (the former Ministry of Railway), some Railways Bureaus and the construction enterprises shows that the choice of interaction preference of both sides tends to the following aspects: one is the interaction mechanism of cost inputs with profit distribution. Benefit promotes the virtuous circle of inputs as a dynamic mechanism, whereas the negative interest leads to an alienated escape mechanism. The other is that the cost inputs and profit distribution are related to strengths and role definitions of the owner and the contractor. Third, it is expected that a key element is to maintain cooperation. Therefore, this paper considers diverse impact factors such as extra gains made from bilateral cooperation, extra gain distribution coefficient, and positive feedback excitation received during cooperation and initial cost when both sides take the trust policy in the evolutionary game. The positive feedback excitation factor is also referred based on the evolutionary game model under static cooperation, adjusts the payoff matrix to embody the time-dependent nature of cooperative evolution so that the model gets more reasonable. Assume ∆R is the extra gains made during first cooperation between the owner and the contractor; m is the extra gains distribution coefficient between the owner and the contractor, and 0 ≤ m ≤ 1; K is the initial cost distribution coefficient between the owner and the contractor, and 0 ≤ k ≤ 1 ; r, n are the Positive feedback excitation factors received during cooperation between the owner and the contractor; CO,CC are the initial costs of the owner and the contractor when they take the trust policy, respectively (as inputs when the strategic partnership agreement is reached), and C=CO+CC; P is the penalty paid by one side to the other in the case that one of two sides does not take the cooperative strategy.
(2) Modeling The game agents of the model are the owners and the contractors, the game spaces of both are (cooperative, uncooperative). Based on the basic hypotheses in the model, when the probability of cooperation the owner takes is x, then 1-x is the probability of noncooperation the owner chooses; the probability of cooperation the contractor chooses is y, then 1-y is the probability of noncooperation the contractor chooses. The payoff matrix of game agent is given in Table 2 , which can be regarded as a dynamic game system in theory. The owners and contractors in the early stage of cooperation take uncooperative strategy in that they do not understand and distrust with each other, namely the specific partner is chosen by the bidding procedure; the success in initial cooperation between two sides has laid a solid foundation for future collaboration by competitive negotiation; on the basis of multi-repetitive collaborations, the owner and the contractor convince each other, and carry out cooperation under the agreement model. 
According to hypothesis, the average expected return for owner can be available.
Similarly, the average expected return for contractor will be available.
Since both x and y are not the evolutionary stable strategies, the probability of the owner or the contractor takes the cooperative and uncooperative strategies varies dynamically over time in the random pairing iteration-based game. The Replicator Dynamic Equation (RDE) is hereby cited, which reflects how the odds of individual strategy taken by the game agent in the unit time changes, and expressed as the difference between the expected return and the average revenue of the population. The Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) of the model is derived by evaluating the dynamic equation of the replicator.
RED that owner takes cooperative strategy is:
Similarly, RED that contractor takes cooperative strategy is:
Let f x = = 0, = = 0
Figure 3. Dynamic evolution of strategies
Dynamic Analysis of Evolutionary Game
Local stability analysis As defined in ESS, the game agent is robust against small perturbation. It is required that x meets the homeostasis, based on which, it is able to restore to the steady state when f (x) is disturbed slightly. According to the stability principle of differential equation, if " # * # | #&# * < 0 , x* is the evolutionary stability strategy. According to Friedman's study on the stability of the equilibrium points, the five equilibrium points had been analyzed and derived the results thereof as shown in Table 3 . , when P − / = 1 − 0 ∆1 − 2 1 − 3 / + / , 5 − / 6 = 70∆1 − 23/ + / 6 , the saddle point M = (0.5, 0.5), while △AOCM and △ABCM are identical in the area; thus the whole system evolves toward noncooperation (0, 0) and cooperation (1, 1) with equal probabilities. The dynamic process for specific evolution is shown in Figure. 1.
If (1-λ) ∆R (1+R) t-1 >CC and λ∆R(1+r) t-1 >CO, the initial decision point lies in HMNO. This shows that, when the extra gains from the cooperation between the owners and the contractors are greater than their respective investment, the two eventually tend to develop the cooperation. This is an ideal state where the owners and contractors meet time after time in repetitive cooperation so that their earnings constantly increase under the impact of the positive feedback factor. While the initial cost continues to decrease, x = 1, y = 1 turns into an evolutionary equilibrium strategy.
If (1-λ)∆R(1+R) t-1 <CC and λ∆R(1+r) t-1 <CO, the initial decision point lies in KMLB. This shows that, when the extra gains from the cooperation between the owners and the contractors are less than their respective investment, the two eventually tend to refuse cooperation. Owner and contractor will predict the subsequent development during their initial cooperation. For the company which runs badly and stays at the peril of future bankruptcy, the other will take an uncooperative strategy in the initial process, at this time, x = 0, Y = 0 turns into the evolutionary equilibrium strategy.
If (1-λ)∆R(1+R) t-1 <CC and λ∆R(1+r) t-1 >CO, the initial decision point lies in HMLC. This indicates that, when the owner disposes to cooperate with the contractor, provided that the owner's extra gain is greater than his/her initial inputs. However the contractor's extra gain is less than his/her initial inputs, he/she chooses uncooperative strategy. In the current market of railway construction, there is an extremely unequal relationship between the owner and the contractor, and quite often, many contractors compete for a project, which allows the owner to transfer the risk to the contractor during the process of cooperation, where x = 1, y = 0 turns into the evolutionary equilibrium strategy.
If (1-λ)∆R(1+R) t-1 >CC and λ∆R(1+r) t-1 <CO, the initial decision point lies in KMN. This shows that, when the owner's extra profit is less than his/her initial inputs, he/she is reluctant to cooperate with contractor; while the contractor's extra profit is greater than his/her initial inputs, he/she tends to cooperate with owner. x=0，y=1 turns into the evolutionary equilibrium strategy.
Effect of impact factors on cooperation level
The evolution path of the cooperation relationship between the owner and the contractor in the railway construction is susceptible to many factors. The probability of cooperation between the owner and the contractor can be expressed as the area of zone I, as shown in the figure, the area of zone I is:
It is known from the above equation that the greater the zone I, the higher probability the owner and the contractor cooperate. Therefore during cooperation both sides may adjust initial inputs and profit distribution in due course, which can affect the evolutionary game, being manifested as below:
(1) Effect of Positive feedback excitation factor on evolution results The positive feedback excitation factors r, n are evaluated by the equation as above, ;< = ; > 0, ;< = ; < 0. This shows that the area of zone I goes up as r increases and n decreases, that is, the probability the system evolves toward B(1,1) also gets high. The probability that the owner and the contractor reach cooperation is positive correlation with cooperative profit factors, and negative correlation with cost input factor. It implies that, in the case that two sides tend to cooperative strategy, the repetitive cooperation expands returns, plus the cost reduces frequently, the system evolves toward B (1, 1) in a steady way.
(2) Effect of profit distribution mechanism It is derived from analysis that, the effect of profit distribution m and cost input coefficient k on the zone S I area is not dull, the second partial deviation of S I in relation to m is evaluated, , 9 has maximum, so that the probability that the owner and contractor evolve toward B (1,1) is highest, namely there is an optimal profit distribution coefficient that prompts both sides to operate most likely.
Similarly, the second partial deviation of 9 in relation to k is evaluated, , 9 takes maximum. The result from above analysis shows that there is optimal profit distribution coefficient and cost distribution coefficient that prompt both sides to operate most likely.
(3) Effect of interior penalty and excitation on evolution results As a key factor to cooperative trend, is substituted to evaluate the first partial deviation is interior penalty factor and positive correlation with cooperative probability, while P is negative correlation with it. It is proved that in the process of cooperation between owner and contractor, the central government and the railway corporation should give some external incentive measures as the railway construction plays a significant role in the national development. When the exterior excitation and interior penalty reach certain thresholds, the owner and the contractor tend to B(1,1) cooperative evolution mode.
Analysis of Dynamic Evolution
In this study, the foregoing part analyzes the relationship between the owner and the contractor in the railway construction project by the evolutionary model, and provides the concrete evolution strategy. To more intuitively describe the impact of factors on the evolution stability strategy for owner and contractor in the railway construction, now we use matlab software for numerical simulation.
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Effect of Positive feedback excitation factor
Cooperation has a "1+1>2" synergic effect. The greater this synergic effect, the probability two sides cooperate. This paper applies the MATLAB to have a numerical simulation on the correlation between the Positive feedback excitation factor r in synergy effect and the probability that two sides cooperate. The result reveals that, as shown in Figure. 4, the probability magnifies with the increase of r, and is closely related to cost excitation factor n. The rate of convergence of probability two sides operate increases fast as n reduces, which shows that repetitive cooperation between two sides induce the fact that, the lower the input cost of two sides, the higher the probability two sides cooperate. 
Effect of profit distribution factor
The analysis shows that the impact of the profit distribution and the cost allocation is not dull linearly on the probability of evolutionary cooperation between two sides. A correlation is obtained after the numerical simulation is conducted for the probability two sides cooperate and profit distribution and the cost allocation, as shown in the figure, which shows that the profit distribution coefficient has different effect on the evolution result. As shown in Figure. 5, the probability two sides cooperate is subjected to increase with the profit distribution coefficient, first gradually to the maximum value, and then decline, which implies that there is an optimal profit distribution coefficient to maximize the cooperative probability, alike to the above. 
Effect of initial cooperation strategy
Assume the parameters in the game payoff matrix between two sides are given blow: CO=50, CC=70, ∆R =200, r=1.1, P=100, n=0.8, if y=0.7, the simulation conducted on the owner's evolution process may generate a dynamic evolution for owner's strategy, as shown in Figure. 6. As shown in Figure. 6, in the initial probability of each "cooperative" strategy, when the probability owner chooses the "cooperation" strategy is greater than 0.5, it eventually converge to 1, and the convergence rate will be subjected to accelerate with the increase of initial probability. When the probability owner chooses the "cooperation" strategy is less than 0.5, it will eventually converge to 0, and the convergence rate will be subjected to decrease with the initial probability. In the initial probability of each "cooperative" strategy, the probability that owner chooses the "cooperative" strategy will eventually converge to 0, and the convergence rate will be subjected to decelerate with the increase of the initial probability, that is, when the probability that contractor chooses "cooperative" strategy is less than 0.5, that the owner takes the final uncooperative strategy is the evolutionary stability equilibrium strategy.
The above numerical simulation shows that the probabilities that the owner and the contractor tend to cooperate on the threshold are all greater than 0.5, B (1,1) is their evolutionary stability equilibrium state.
Conclusions
Strong reciprocity focused on studying the evolution of cooperation and proved that the cooperation order of stability could be built by punishing the selfish free-rider based on computer simulation. This paper takes the neural mechanism of cooperative behavior between owner and contractor as entry point, constructs the evolutionary game model including synergy effect coefficient and other parameters, and employs MATLAB simulation system to reveal the inherent mechanism emerged in the dynamic process of the cooperation between the owner and the contractor in the railway construction project. Changing corresponding impact factors can speed up the evolution of cooperation between owner and contractor. The study result shows:
(1) The synergy effect of the cooperative behaviors between the owner and the contractor in the railway construction project, that is, the constant increase of the profits and the continuous reduction of the cost can direct the cooperative evolution of both sides to the Pareto optimality.
(2) The reasonable profit and cost distribution mechanism between the owners and the contractor and the ratio of cost allocation help two sides reach win-win model. The existence of the optimal profit distribution coefficient makes two sides access to cooperative evolution most likely.
(3) The default costs can restrict the opportunism behaviors of the owners or contractors to some extent, and the external incentive policies formulated by the government or by the railway corporation can partially mitigate the impact of external environment on cooperative evolution.
(4) The initial strategy has a crucial impact on the evolution of the cooperation behavior between the owner and the contractor. Only when the initial selection probabilities of both sides are greater than 0.5, can the cooperation behavior between the owner and the contractor evolve towards B(1,1). This shows that the evolution of the cooperative behavior between the owner and the contractor is affected by the construction market environment extremely greater.
The above model belongs to a deterministic kinetic equation. In the future, the evolution of the relationship between the owner and the contractor in the railway construction project can be interpreted with the stochastic evolutionary game model and the social network model, in order to explore from the microscopic perspective the interactive behavioral strategies between the two sides.
